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War will never be abolished by  people who are 
ignorant of war. 
-Walter Lippmanl 
I. Introduction 
As the brilliant Allied military victory in the Persian Gulf 
recognizes its first anniversary, the focus has shifted from the 
emotions of homecoming celebrations to the seriousness of les- 
sons learned and lessons validated. While the ingredients of 
victory are a combination of many factors-from logistics to 
training to armament-history has shown that one of the most 
important elements in a successful combat operation is the 
quality of the commander. The commander decides the strat- 
egy, directs the tactics, and inspires the morale of his soldiers. 
To those mediocre captains of history who arrogantly relied on 
sheer numbers of forces to ensure success on the battlefield, 
the past is replete with the story of the small army which, 
with the leadership of a great commander, overwhelms numer- 
ically superior forces. 
Operation Desert Storm2 confirmed that the American com- 
mander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, was no mediocre 
leader. Clearly, he had learned well many of the lessons writ- 
ten in the bloody ink of military history. In this context, the 
war also paid a magnificent tribute, albeit a silent one, to a 
man who is arguably the greatest military leader this country 
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has ever produced-Robert E. Lee. Actually, not only in the 
sphere of battlefield tactics, but in ensuring strict adherence to 
the laws regulating ~ a r f a r e , ~  General Lee and General 
Schwarzkopf had much in common; tactical skills and ethical 
conduct go hand in hand in the making of a great leader. 
Unfortunately, however, many are unaware of the phenome- 
nal benefits that our military has most certainly drawn from 
General Lee. Curiously, this was brought out by the battle in 
the Persian Gulf, When reporters asked General Schwarzkopf 
which military leaders he most admired, Schwarzkopf, as ex- 
pected, turned to the War Between the States for his examples. 
What was totally unexpected to some, however, was that he 
departed from the opinions of recent prominent American mili- 
tary leaders who typically cited General Lee,4 and instead cited 
General William T. Sherman as one of his heroes5 As this arti- 
cle will assert, the United States of America was fortunate 
that both General Schwarzkopf and the forces under his com- 
mand emulated the tactics and humanity of the Confederate 
General instead of the Union leader he mentioned. 
Although General Schwarzkopf’s public admiration for Gen- 
eral Sherman really raised little concern about the soundness 
of America’s military strategy or its willingness to abide by the 
law of war in the conduct of hostilities, his recognition of Sher- 
man and exclusion of Lee does raise several critical issues. 
The laws of war consist of all of those laws, by treaty and customary principles, 
that are applicable to warfare. Its basic role is to limit the impact of the evils of war 
by: “(1) Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; 
(2) Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands 
of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians; and 
(3) Facilitating the restoration of peace.” Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, The 
Law of Land Warfare, at  3 (July 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10]. 
The previous commander of an American force equivalent in size to the one com- 
manded by General Schwarzkopf was General William Westmoreland, from the Viet- 
nam War. The man General Westmoreland most often cited as his role model was 
General Lee. In his memoirs, A Soldier Reports, he leaves no doubt that his touchstone 
was Robert E. Lee. Lee so influenced the Westmoreland family that when his father 
died, General Westmoreland had a favorite quotation from Lee carved into the head- 
stone: “Duty is the sublimest word in the English language.” See JAMES RESTOR, JR., 
Lewis Lord, civil War Tactics Could Win ‘The Mother o j  Battles,’ U.S. XEWS AND 
WORLD REP., Feb. 25, 1991, at 42; Paul Hoversten, Schwarzkopf Introspective, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 28, 1991, at 6A. Schwarzkopf also named General Ulysses S. Grant. Grant 
is remembered best for his resolve to “fight it out.” In the first month that Grant 
confronted Lee-from May to June 1864-he sacrificed, in suicidal frontal assaults, 
over 50,000 of his men. This was a five-to-one loss ratio against the ill-fed and ill- 
equipped Confederate forces. Grant compensated for Lee’s tactical superiority by rely- 
ing on overwhelming manpower and material to wear Lee down. Although the Feder- 
als were defeated in almost every engagement, Grant correctly understood that the 
Federal forces could keep losing longer than the Rebels could keep winning. 
SHERMAN’S MARCH AND VIETSAM 279 (1984). 
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First, recognizing the importance of image projection, it pro- 
vides an opportunity to examine the roots of America’s inter- 
national reputation in terms of war-making and the role of law 
in regulating this conduct.6 Second, from both a tactical and 
law-of-war perspective, whom did our commanders and 
soldiers most emulate-Robert E. Lee or William T. Sherman? 
11. R.E. Lee 
The blow, whenever struck, must, to be successful, 
be sudden and heavy. 
-R.E. Lee7 
An unspoken tribute to General R.E. Lee was particularly 
evident in the grand strategy used by the American com- 
mander in the Gulf. As General Schwarzkopf held his “vic- 
tory” press conference and explained the concept of the over- 
all operation in the defeat of the Iraqi forces, he obviously not 
only had been able to apply the lessons and experiences of his 
own career successfully, but also had drawn heavily from the 
wisdom of General Lee. 
To the serious student of American history, Schwarzkopf’s 
celebrated “Hail Mary” flanking movement to the west of the 
enemy strongly echoed from another time and place. While no 
two wars are ever alike, and every commander’s actions must 
be evaluated in terms of their unique circumstances, the basic 
tactics employed in the “hundred-hour’’ ground war were un- 
deniably similar to those used by the commander of the Con- 
federacy’s Army of Northern Virginia. 
Time after time, General Lee executed magnificent flanking 
movements at battles such as Second Manassas (1862), Chan- 
cellorsville (1863), and The Wilderness ( 1864).8 Similarly, the 
ground phase of Operation Desert Storm was vintage Lee- 
that is, fix the enemy forces in place and hit them suddenly 
6See also Stephen W. Sears, McClellan vs. Lee, MIL. HIST. Q. ,  Autumn 1988, at  10. A 
similar comparison between Lee and another Union commander, General George Mc- 
Clellan, concludes that Lee probably was the greatest American military commander 
ever produced and that McClellan was someone who had considerable military knowl- 
edge, wanted to be president, and “sat a horse well.” 
’ Rod Gragg, The Quotable Robert E. Lee, S. PARTISAN IX, 1989, at  26, 31. 
*See generally DOUGLAS SOUTHALL FREEMAN, LEE’S LIEUTEKANTS, A STUDY IN COMMAKD 
(1946). Lee’s only major error during the War Between the States was the frontal 
assault he ordered on the third day at  Gettysburg, in July 1863. Failing to break the 
Federal defenses, he still was able to withdraw his army intact. 
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and heavily in the flank. The heart and soul of Lee’s superior 
strategy was based on surprise and economy of force-the 
same key elements superbly employed in Operation Desert 
Storm. 
A. Lee as a Role Model 
That America’s military leaders continue to concentrate on 
the military campaigns of General Lee is, of course, no revela- 
tion to most senior officers in the armed forces. Even the 
United States Navy acknowledges the leadership abilities of 
Lee, studying and publishing at the Naval War College the 
works of scholars who have devoted their entire lives to ex- 
ploring the person and legend of Lee.g As for Lee’s most natu- 
ral constituency-the ground commanderslo-one need only 
take a cursory tour of the Army War College in Pennsylvania 
to confirm its commitment to studying the War Between the 
States in general, and R.E. Lee in particular. Battle scenes from 
the bloodiest war in American history hang from almost every 
hall in the institution. In a recent United States Army War 
College publication concerning two of Lee’s most classic victo- 
ries, the authors confidently challenged modern officers to 
learn from, and appreciate the genius of, Lee and his corps 
commander T.J. “Stonewall” Jackson. In the preface they note, 
“Lee and Jackson did not see themselves as old soldiers; they 
considered themselves modern soldiers, and today’s officers 
will quickly learn to identify with them.”” 
~~~~~ ~ 
@See STUART W. SMITH, DOUGLAS SOUTHALL FREEMAN ON LEADERSHIP (1990). Published by 
the Naval War College Press for use in the training of senior Naval officers, it encom- 
passes every aspect of Lee’s tremendous leadership qualities. See also Douglas 
Southall Freeman, Robert E. Lee: Maker ofMorale, 44 NAVAL WAR C. REV., 75 (1991). 
But see David Maurer, Putting the General 0% the Couch, THE DAILY PROGRESS, Sept. 30, 
1991, at  A7. Lee’s reluctance to shame or humiliate another person was probably his 
only handicap as a commander. Dr. J. Anderson Thomson, a noted psychiatrist from 
Charlottesville, Virginia, pointed out this paradox concerning Lee: “Here’s a person 
who is considered one of the greatest leaders of men in the deadliest form of conflict 
known, armed warfare, who in inner-personal contacts had difficulty reprimanding or 
tactfully criticizing a subordinate who had disappointed or even failed him terribly.” 
HISTORY (1979); MICHAEL SHAARA, THE KILLER ASGELS (1990). These books are just sam- 
ples of many used by the United States Army in the training of its officers at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. In addition, Lee’s Chancellorsville campaign is given detailed 
attention in a separate block of instruction. 
lo  See JOHN E. JESSCP & ROBERT w. COAKLEY, A GUIDE TO THE STUDY AND USE OF MILITARY 
JAY LCVAS & HOWARD w. NELSON, THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE GUIDE TO THE BATTLES 
OF CHANCELLORSVILLE A N D  FREDERICKSBURG xvii (1988) (emphasis added). 
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B. Lee’s Impact on the American Military 
Apart from being the most enduring conflict in the nation’s 
psyche, the “Civil War”12 brought into focus the extraordinary 
genius of General R.E. Lee-a genius so phenomenal that his 
impact upon the armed forces of the United States is still felt 
over a hundred and twenty years after his death. This is not 
surprising, however, when one considers that even before the 
outbreak of the War, Lee’s military value already was firmly 
established in the young nation. 
General Winfield Scott, commander of the American forces 
during the Mexican War (1846-1848), noted on many occasions 
that that war was won due largely to the efforts of, then, Cap- 
tain Robert E. Lee. Captain Lee had made such an impression 
on Scott that thirteen years later, in 1861, when asked about 
the best officer in the United States military, he promptly re- 
plied, “I tell you, sir, that Robert E. Lee is the greatest soldier 
now living, and if he ever gets the opportunity, he will prove 
himself the greatest captain of history.”13 
President Abraham Lincoln also was well acquainted with 
Lee’s military acumen. In April 1861, before Colonel Lee-then 
serving in the 2d United States Cavalry-had to decide be- 
tween Virginia and the Union, Lincoln eagerly tendered to Lee 
the supreme command of all Union forces in the field. If he had 
accepted, Lee would have been second only to General Scott, 
who was then the general-in-chief of the Federal forces. 
Weighing a devoted career spanning over thirty years of ser- 
vice to the Armed Forces of the United States against his at- 
tachment to Virginia, Lee turned down this greatest of all op- 
portunities.14 Taken to the mountain top of temptation and 
offered what many a soldier dreams of-fantastic success and 
fame -Lee maintained his loyalty to his state and family, 
thereby reflecting to the world a glimpse of his incredible in- 
n The term “the War” refers to the War Between the States, popularly called the 
American Civil War. However, Francis Lieber, the author of the Union’s rules regulat- 
ing warfare, correctly asserted that the conflict between North and South was not a 
“civil war.” Lieber commonly defined the term civil war as, “War between two or 
more portions of a country or state, each contending for the mastery of the whole, and 
each claiming to be the legitimate government.” See RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S 
CODE AKD THE LAW OF WAR 18 (1983). As Mark Twain, himself a former Confederate 
soldier, often remarked, “In the South, the War is what A.D. is elsewhere, they date 
from it.” 
l 3  REV. J. WILLIAM JONES, LIFE AKD LETTERS OF GENERAL ROBERT EDWARD LEE 129 (1906). 
14Gragg, supra note 7, at 31. Just before submitting his resignation, Lee wrote, 
“With all my devotion to the Union, and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an Ameri- 
can citizen, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my 
relatives, my children, and my home.” 
120 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 136 
tegrity. A product of southern aristocracy, honor and duty 
were more important than fame. He could not draw his sword 
against his native state. W.T. Sherman would later write of 
At the conclusion of the War Between the States, military 
leaders throughout the world quickly recognized the incredible 
battlefield accomplishments of Lee. British, Prussian, and 
French officers, renowned in their own rights, expressed only 
the highest regard for General Lee.16 The great British officer, 
General Garnett Joseph Wolseley, had observed Lee at first- 
hand during the War and called him a genius in the art of 
warfare, “being apart and superior to all others in every way, 
a man with whom none I ever knew and few of whom I have 
read are worthy to be c1assed.”l7 
While the Virginia of the Old South long since has faded, in 
the decades that have passed and to this day, Lee’s name only 
has increased in brightness,18 illuminating the pages of mili- 
tary doctrine as perhaps no other soldier in American history. 
“Few public figures in any age have bequeathed such an en- 
during legacy of national respect and affection , . . , ” l9  In- 
deed, in the history of the United States, no officer has in- 
spired such great devotion and trust in his soldiers as did 
General Lee.20 
This leadership quality was illustrated beautifully in an inci- 
dent just before the surrender at Appomattox when Lee turned 
to Brigadier General Henry Wise and asked him what the army 
and country would think of him once he surrendered. General 
Wise, a former governor of Virginia blurted out, “General Lee, 
Lee, “His Virginia was to him the world . . . . ”15 
l5 JUSTIN WINTLE, THE DICTIOXARY OF WAR QUOTATIONS 280 (1989). 
l6  British soldiers included Colonel Chesney, Lord Wolseley, Lord Roberts, and Colo- 
nel Henderson; Prussian soldiers included Von Moltke, Bismarck, Colonel Von Borcke, 
Colonel Scheibert, and Major Mangold. See Jones, supra note 13, at  483. 
171d. at 484. 
‘*See PAUL C. KAGEL, THE LEES OF VIRGINIA 300-05 (1990). World-wide recognition of 
Lee as a great “soldier, gentleman and Christian” first began in France, in the mid- 
1870’s. By the first decade of the twentieth century, Britain also had become en- 
thralled totally with Lee-in part because of the great English writer Henry James. 
The Canadians, who always had been sympathetic to the South, quickly expressed 
their high regards for General Lee. By the time Lee died in 1870, the Montreal Tele- 
graph was able to say, “Posterity will rank Lee above Wellington or Napoleon, before 
Saxe or Turenne, above Marlborough or Frederick, before Alexander, or Caesar . . . . 
In fact, the greatest general of this or any other age. He made his own name, and the 
Confederacy he served, immortal.” JONES, supra note 13, at  483. 
l 9  ROD GRAGG, ILLUSTRATED COXFEDERATE READER 224 (1989). 
20See GREGORY J .  URKIN, THE UNITED STATES INFANTRY 15-30 (1988). One could argue 
that General George Washington perhaps equalled Lee in terms of devotion by his 
soldiers. 
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don’t you know that you are the army . I . . [Tlhere is no 
country. There has been no country, for a year or more. You 
are the country to these men.”21 
Arguably, Lee contributed more than any other single man in 
setting the very bedrock for some of the most outstanding and 
valuable attributes of American military power. That bedrock 
is so strong today that, when asked to identify the most nota- 
ble characteristics of the United States military, one can ex- 
pect the worldwide response to literally echo Lee’s signature- 
superior tactical abilities in combat leaders and civilized con- 
duct of Americans in war. 
That the American military establishment proudly has main- 
tained its reputation not only for sound military tactics, but 
also for an unmatched sense of humanity, is well known.22 One 
of the men most responsible for all of this-General Lee-is 
not as well advertised. Perhaps the passage of time has con- 
cealed his name. On the other hand, Lee’s fame may have been 
reduced by an unfortunate legacy, marred in the minds of 
many Americans who still lack an understanding of his 
cause .23 
In spite of the fact that its greatest champion often is over- 
looked, Lee’s tactics and civility have become ingrained into 
the character of the United States military establishment. Al- 
though these qualities certainly existed before the emergence 
Joseph B. Mitchell, You Are the Army, CIVIL WAR, July-Aug. 1991, at 26. When 
General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia in April 1866, all military 
forces throughout the South quickly followed suit. The identification with Lee clearly 
was so great that much of the Confederate military followed Lee, rather than Presi- 
dent Jefferson Davis, who advocated continued resistance. 
22See B. BLECHMAN & S. KAPLAN, FORCE WITHOUT WAR 9 (1979). No nation has been as 
active as the United States in adherence to the rules of warfare, as well as the peace- 
time use of its forces “in providing disaster assistance and similar supportive activi- 
ties.” Id. 
23 See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Values and Religion in  the CoMederate Armies, CONFEDER- 
ATE VETERAN, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at  29-38. The popular revisionistic claim that the aver- 
age Confederate soldier fought to perpetuate the evil of slavery is without historical 
validity. While the issue of slavery was certainly a catalyst, the vast majority of 
Confederate soldiers did not own slaves, or ever hoped to own them. They did not 
view themselves as fighting for slavery. Actually, the greatest leaders in the army 
were opposed strongly to the institution. General Lee owned no slaves, and those in 
his wife’s estates were freed in 1862. His opposition to the evil of human servitude is 
well documented. Before the War, he believed in a process of gradual manumission. At 
the conclusion of the War, having suffered total poverty from its effects, he wrote, 
So far from engaging in a war to perpetuate slavery, I am rejoiced that slavery is 
abolished. I believe it will be greatly for the interests of the South. So fully am I 
satisfied of this . . . that  I would cheerfully have lost all I have lost by the war 
and szCffered all I have suJfered, to have this object attained.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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of Lee the general, his genius and humanity have epitomized 
and translated them into the very fabric of subsequent Ameri- 
can military doctrines. For this reason, any analysis of the 
United States military-either in terms of tactics or comport- 
ment with the law of war-that ignores the tremendous contri- 
butions of General Lee never can be more than a fraction of 
the truth. More closely than any other officer in this nation’s 
history, Lee has proved to be the most qualified to project the 
American standard of behavior in these areas. 
111. W.T. Sherman 
/Wle are not only fighting hostile armies, but a 
hostile people, and must make old and young, rich 
and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as 
their organized armies. 24 
-W.T. Sherman 
When General Schwarzkopf listed General Sherman as 
among those whom he most admired from history, many mis- 
understood the reasons associated with that choice and hence, 
the efficacy of his statement.26 In the minds of many Ameri- 
cans-particularly in the South-the name of W .T. Sherman 
immediately is associated with a most heinous array of war 
crimes. 
During his 1864 march from Atlanta to the sea, and then 
through South Carolina, Sherman employed a concept of “total 
war,”26-a concept that included the targeting of defenseless 
civilian populations. The wanton destruction and theft of non- 
military property that resulted from that campaign, arguably 
marked Sherman as one of the most infamous figures in Ameri- 
can military history. Of course, this was not the attribute that 
General Schwarzkopf sought to embrace when he listed Sher- 
man as one of his heros. Was it then the tactical side of Sher- 
man that won Schwarzkopf’s respect? 
24 RUSSEL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE Uh’ITED STATES ARMY 252 (1984). 
25See supra text accompanying note 5. News releases did not give any detailed 
explanation for General Schwarzkopf‘s admiration of Sherman. The reasons ad- 
vanced included: (1) he was a “muddy boot” soldier; (2)  he did not worry about 
taking the credit for accomplishments-only for getting the job done; and (3) he 
hated war, but waged it ferociously. 
26See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at  300-02. 
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Few historians rank General Sherman among the brilliant.27 
Most writers believe that he was far too cautious when con- 
ducting war against sizable concentrations of enemy soldiers. 
“As a consequence he tended to hold back both in the employ- 
ment and deployment of his forces. This in turn either cost him 
defeats, as at Missionary Ridge, or else lost him the fruits of 
victory, as at  Jonesboro.”28 
As a military commander Sherman was, at  best, only aver- 
age. Compared to the vast majority of Union general officers, 
however, Sherman looked fairly capable. His mainstay was his 
tenacity, not his imagination. Tenacity, on the other hand, can 
do great things when juxtaposed with a tremendous military 
might, such as was furnished to him by the industrialized 
North. Sherman systematically could conduct his version of 
“total war” at  will. 
After burning the entire city of Atlanta to the ground, Sher- 
man set out with over 62,000 Federal soldiers-not to engage 
Confederate combat forces, but to “make Georgia 
Tragically, the only persons who “howl” under such brutal ac- 
tivities are members of the defenseless civilian population- 
primarily women and children. Although Sherman issued “offi- 
cial” orders that prohibited the trespass of all dwellings, re- 
quired the leaving of reasonable provisions for families who 
were forced to provide food, and even prohibited the use of 
profane language, in reality none of these orders actually were 
enforced.30 The soldiers were allowed to rob, pillage, and burn 
in a swath of horror that, from one wing of his forces to the 
other, extended almost sixty miles in width. 
As members of the Union army approached their homes, de- 
fenseless southern civilians understood the approaching terror. 
In the distance, they could see the pillars of smoke by day and 
the fires by night. If Sherman did not order the rape31 and 
27 Thomas Robertson, The War in Words, CIVIL WAR TIMES ILLUS., Oct. 1979, at  20. 
28 Id. 
29 WINTLE, supra note 16, at  281. Sherman wired to General Grant on Sept. 9, 
1864, “Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless to occupy it; but the utter 
destruction of its roads, houses and people will cripple their military resources. I 
can make this march and make Georgia howl.” The Confederate army under Gen- 
eral Hood had evacuated Atlanta and marched north into Tennessee. Apart from 
Rebel cavalry to harass his flanks, or small local home guards consisting of old 
men and boys, General Sherman faced no significant military opposition until he 
reached North Carolina. 
30 RESTOX, supra note 4, at  67. 
31 Because of the social stigma attached, rape was a crime seldom discussed in 
nineteenth century America; victims often kept the crime to themselves. While it 
was probably less widespread than some might allege, documented cases of Sher- 
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other physical abuses that accompanied his campaign of ter- 
ror, he-as the commander of the army-must have shared 
responsibility for these additional crimes.32 
Boasting of his wholesale looting and burning through Geor- 
gia, General W.T. Sherman telegraphed to his superior, General 
U S .  Grant,33 “I sincerely believe that the whole United States, 
North and South, would rejoice to have this army turned loose 
on South Carolina, to devastate that state in the manner we 
have done in Later, as Sherman headquartered in 
man’s forces raping black and white Southerners occurred. Dr. Daniel Trezevant, a 
respected physician in Columbia, South Carolina, listed several cases of which he 
had personal knowledge. See GRAGG, supra note 19, at  192-96. But see RESTOK, 
supra note 4, at  73-74. In the city of Milledgeville, Georgia, only one rape of a 
white female could be substantiated by a respected writer and physician, Dr. 
James Bonner. 
32 Modern concepts of what is termed “indirect responsibility” come from two 
American cases. The obvious standard to apply to a commander is the “direct 
knowledge” standard. If a commander orders a violation of the law of war, or 
does nothing to stop a violation he has knowledge about, he is guilty of those 
crimes. This is known as the Medina standard, so named from the courts-martial 
of Captain Ernest Medina, for his role in the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. The 
second standard for command responsibility comes out of the Yamashita case 
from World War 11. Yamashita, a Japanese general officer, was tried for the rape 
and murder spree committed by 20,000 Japanese troops in Manila. Although the 
military commission was unable to prove that Yamashita ordered the crimes, it 
held him responsible under a “should have known“ theory. If, through normal 
events, the commander should have known of the crime, but did nothing to stop it, 
he or she is guilty of the actions of his or her soldiers. This “should have known” 
standard applies only when a widespread pattern of abuse over a long period of 
time has existed. In this scenario, the commander is presumed either to have 
knowledge of the crimes or to have abandoned his or her command. See JOHK 
NORTOK MOORE, FREDERICK S. TIPSOK, & ROBERT F: TURKER, NATIOKAL SECURITY LAW 
33 As his superior, General Grant shares culpability for Sherman’s actions. Grant 
actually approved, and later defended, the actions of his subordinate. Sherman, 
however, could not rely on the defense of superior orders to escape responsibility. 
This rule was firmly established in the context of the only major “war crimes” 
trial that came out of the War-the Union trial of Confederate Major Henry Wirz. 
Major Wirz was the commandant of the Andersonville prisoner of war camp in 
Georgia and was charged with numerous offenses, to include murder. Although 
the trial was flawed in many respects, it correctly affirmed a principle of law- 
that is, the defense of superior orders would not justify violations of the law of 
war. See Glen W. LaForce, The Trial of Mqjor Henry Wirz: A National Disgrace, 
THE ARMY LAW., Jan. 1988, at 3. 
34 Because South Carolina was the first southern state to secede from the Union, 
Sherman felt that the citizens of the state should be made to suffer. GRAGG, supra 
note 7, at 30. Sherman thoroughly devastated South Carolina. A noted northern 
journalist, John T. Trowbridge, traveled through South Carolina just after the War 
ended and recorded the sight that greeted him: 
No language can describe, nor can catalogue furnish, an adequate detail of the 
wide-spread destruction of homes and property. The negroes were robbed equally 
with the whites of food and clothing, The roads were covered with butchered 
cattle, hogs, mules, and the costliest furniture. 
For the full text, see GRAGG, supra note 19, at  180. 
387-401 (1990). 
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the finest mansion in Savannah, he again corresponded with 
Grant concerning his upcoming march through South Carolina. 
As if attempting to shed all responsibility for controlling his 
army Sherman said, “the whole army is burning with an insati- 
able desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost 
tremble for her fate, but I feel she deserves all that seems in 
store for her.”36 
A. The Law of War During the War Between the States 
Even though the modern international rules regulating the 
conduct of armed forces during combat, as codified in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, did not exist during the War Between the 
States, Sherman certainly violated the well-established custom- 
ary  prohibition^^^ of his day in addition to the much praised 
Lieber Code.37 Issued to the Union forces as General Order No. 
100, the Lieber Code spelled out very specific rules in the con- 
duct of warfare, “correspond[ing] to a great extent to the laws 
and customs of war existing at that time.” This code, coupled 
with the existing customary obligations, absolutely prohibited 
the larceny, vandalism, or indiscriminate burning of civilian 
property, as well as all associated crimes of violence against 
civilians. Article 47 of the Lieber Code provided that: 
Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, mur- 
der, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, 
fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American sol- 
dier in a hostile country against its inhabitants, are not 
only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death 
is not inflicted, the severer punishment shall be pre- 
ferred ,38 
36 RESTON, supra note 4, at 96. 
36See generally HARTIGAK, supra note 12, at  664. Sherman “mocked the West Point 
canons that condemn[ed] atrocities, calling the canons ‘old notions.’ ” JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, 
BURKE MARSHALL & JACK SCHWARTZ, THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND ITS COVER-UP: BEYOND THE 
REACH OF LAW? 664 (1976). 
37 DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIAI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 3 (1988). Francis 
Lieber, a German international law scholar and professor at  Columbia University, was 
asked by the Federal authorities to draft a code for the conduct of war on land. 
Promulgated as “Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in 
the Field,” it was issued on April 24, 1863. The Lieber Code consisted of 167 articles. 
See also MOORE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 309-10. The Southern forces adopted their 
own code of conduct for land warfare in 1861-“Articles of War, Regulations of the 
Army of the Confederate States.” But see id. at 120-30. In June of 1863, James A. 
Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, pledged to abide by most of the substantive 
provisions of the Lieber Code. 
38See SCHIKDLER & TOMAN, supra note 37, at 10 (emphasis added). 
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Certainly, many Union officers and soldiers assigned to Sher- 
man did display military discipline, but the vast majority of 
Sherman’s troops soon discovered that the chain of command 
made little effort to protect civilians or civilian property.39 
Early in the “march,” some subordinate commanders, such as 
General Oliver Howard, dutifully informed Sherman that the 
soldiers were committing “inexcusable and wanton acts.”40 
While still marching through Georgia, well before the most bar- 
barous atrocities were committed, General Howard even issued 
his own orders: 
It having come to the knowledge of the major general com- 
manding that the crime of arson and robbery have become 
frequent throughout this army, notwithstanding positive 
orders both from these and superior headquarters having 
been repeatedly issued . . . it is hereby ordered: that 
hereafter any officer or man of this command discovered 
in pillaging a house or burning a building without proper 
authority, will upon sufficient proof thereof, be shot.41 
Despite such “official” directives that threatened death by 
firing squad for any form of pillaging, not a single Union sol- 
dier ever was executed.42 The obligatory “wink at the law” 
had been given.43 Accordingly, bands of roaming marauders, 
calling themselves foragers or “Sherman’s Bummers,” engaged 
in indiscriminate plunder upon the defenseless civilian popula- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Sherman essentially refused to establish a military po- 
lice force to “watch and discipline his own men because to 
have done so would have delayed the ~ p e r a t i o n . ” ~ ~  
In defending his a t r ~ c i t i e s , ~ ~  General Sherman did not at- 
tempt to conceal his crimes under the guise of military neces- 
sity. As provided in article 44 of the Lieber Code,47 destruction 
39 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
4 0 R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  supra note 4, at  70. Howard related this to Sherman on November 23, 
1864. 
Id. General Howard issued this order on November 24, 1864. 
42 Id. 
43 WEIGLEY, supra note 24, at 301. “[Hlis men knew he [Sherman] would understand if 
they went beyond the orders. A great deal of unauthorized and individual looting went 
on as the army ripped across the state, and it went unpunished.” Id. 
44 See MARSHA LANDRETH, WILLIAM T. SHERMAN (1990). 
45See GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 36, at  555. 
46 Despite numerous eyewitness accounts to the contrary, Sherman always denied 
the burning of Columbia, blaming it on the retreating Confederate cavalry. See Ber- 
nard Davidson, ctho Burned Columbia?-A Review of General Sherman’s View of the 
&fair, in 7 S .  HIST. SOC’Y PAPERS 185-92 (1977). 
47 SCHINDLER & TOMAS, supra note 37, at  6,  10. 
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of private property was allowed upon the order of an officer in 
the case of military necessity. Although the exception was 
worded in the negative-“all destruction of property not com- 
manded by the authorized officer . . , are p r ~ h i b i t e d ” ~ ~  -it
was not meant to be construed broadly. If article 44 allowed 
the means for an officer to order an otherwise illegal act, arti- 
cles 14 through 16-by setting out strict definitions of the 
term military necessity-certainly limited his ability to issue 
such commands.4g Article 14 held that military necessity “con- 
sists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensa- 
ble for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful 
according to the modern law and usages of war.”6o 
Anticipating that most cases of military necessity would in- 
volve the taking of food stuffs from the local population, arti- 
cle 16 of the Lieber Code did allow for the “appropriation of 
whatever an enemy’s country affords necessary for the subsist- 
Sherman, however, paid little attention to the Code. In 
twisted logic based on pure vengeance, he openly and inten- 
tionally targeted innocent civilians to make them suffer for 
having supported the Confederacy,62 rather than to feed his 
troops. Claiming that his barbarous machinations had a bright 
side-that is, they might somehow induce the civilians to sue 
for peace-Sherman freely admitted, “If the . . . [civilians in 
the South] raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will 
answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they 
want peace, they and their relatives must stop the war.”63 By 
his own admission, Sherman purposefully violated article 16 of 
the Lieber Code: 
ence and sqfety of the army . . . ”61 
481d. at 10. 
49 Id. at  6. 
50 Id .  
61 Id. (emphasis added). 
62 See de Mulinen, The Law of War and the Armed Forces, 18 INT’L REV. OF THE RED 
CROSS 18, 20 (1978). ”The only rules that count for the armed forces are those that  
must be applied in war. The question as to who is at  the origin of a conflict and who is 
the victim is a matter belonging to the realm of politics and is of no concern to mem- 
bers of the armed forces.” 
63 WINTLE, supra note 16, at  280. On set of commentators observed, 
In [Sherman’s] view the mission of the Army was to kill, burn, mangle and destroy, 
and in a memorandum to President Lincoln he urged a policy of ruthlessness, 
contending that the war must go on until “enough” southern landowners (innocent 
civilians) were killed off. He did not hesitate to invoke terror. He wrote, “To 
secure the navigation of the Mississippi River I would slay millions; on that point I 
am not only insane, but mad.” 
GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., supra  note 36, at 664. 
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Military necessity does not admit cruelty-that is, the in- 
fliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for re- 
venge, nor of wounding or maiming except in fight . . . 
nor wanton destruction of a district. It . . . does not in- 
clude any act of hostility which makes the return to peace 
unnecessarily difficult.64 
Finally, the popular but erroneous contention by some mod- 
ern writers that “General Sherman’s march of devastation 
. . . during the American Civil War may have been viewed as 
lawful tactics at the time” is simply a twisted manifestation of 
“victor’s justice.”66 The adoption of the Lieber Code as an offi- 
cial military order made the Code absolutely binding on all 
Federal soldiers-particularly the officers who were solemnly 
charged with upholding the laws.66 
B. Total War 
In today’s setting, had General Schwarzkopf followed Sher- 
man’s example of “total war,” not only would he be guilty of 
numerous war crimes, but also the armies he commanded and 
the nations he represented would have been subjected to the 
scorn and ridicule of the entire civilized world.67 Even by the 
somewhat less rigid standards of his own day, General Sher- 
man left the civilized world nothing worth emulating. Obvi- 
ously, however, in stark contrast to his opponent Saddam Hus- 
sein, General Schwarzkopf strictly adhered to both the spirit 
and the letter of all aspects of the law of armed conflict. With 
the wholesale looting, hostage-taking, murdering, torturing, 
raping, and environmental destruction visited upon Kuwait, 
Saddam Hussein actually was the one who carried General 
Sherman’s notion of “total war’’ to unspeakable extremes.6s 
Furthermore, the American Government never would toler- 
ate abuses of this critical rule of law, particularly abuses that 
were command directed. The Bush Administration could be ex- 
pected to take steps immediately to halt any violations of the 
~~~ 
54 SCHIKDLER & TOMAN, supra note 37, at  6. 
56 LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY IK WARFARE: THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE 77 (Peter D. Trooboff 
ed., 1977). Victor’s justice refers to the view that the victorious side can prosecute 
anyone it wishes without regard to normal process of laws. 
See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
57 See Matthew E. Winter, “Finding the Law”-The Values, Identity, and Function 
o f the  International Law Adviser, 128 Mil. L. Rev. 1, (1990). 
1991 (Dec. 1990). 
58 See AMKESTY IKT’L, IRAQ/OCCLPIED KUWAIT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIOKS SINCE AUGUST 2, 
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law of war and to prosecute promptly any Americans guilty of 
these crimes.69 
Unfortunately, Sherman’s conduct evidently was not so 
shocking to the Lincoln Administration.6o Notwithstanding the 
rules that his general breached, the Commander in Chief ap- 
parently accepted Sherman’s conduct. That the American gov- 
ernment tolerated this behavior over 126 years ago should be 
disturbing, but not surprising. For instance, it earlier had con- 
doned the forced evacuation of every human being in most of 
the border areas of western Missouri and, pursuant to General 
Order No. 11, it had directed the burning of every single 
home.61 
Accordingly, when Sherman flippantly quipped, “War is 
he, by his barbarous acts, made it so hellish. Sherman’s 
tactic-to assert that, because war is utterly repulsive, one 
need not abide by rules-is as old as it is f a l l a c i ~ u s . ~ ~  Rules 
regulating the conduct of warfare and the associated punish- 
ments for those who violated those rules always have ex- 
i ~ t e d . ~ ~  The real point of shame may have been that General 
f i g s e e  Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, para. 606(a) (1 
July 1966). Under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, each nation is obligated 
to search for persons alleged to have committed war crimes, to investigate the allega- 
tions, and to prosecute or extradite individuals so accused. In addition, the policy of 
the United States mandates that  all American military personnel who are tried for war 
crimes must be prosecuted in military courts-martial under the substantive provisions 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 
Lincoln apparently was willing to overlook Sherman’s actions because of his suc- 
cesses. The President sent Sherman the following message when he reached Atlanta; 
“God bless you and the army under your command.” GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 36, 
at  666 .  
6* Dino A. Brugioni, The Meanest Bushwacker, BLUE AND GRAY, June 1991, at 32, 34. 
Union General Thomas Ewing issued the order in the fall of 1863. In essence, all 
individuals residing in an area that covered four western counties in Missouri were 
given 16 days to evacuate. The homes, farms, and fields of some 20,000 civilians were 
burned, and many of their personal valuables were stolen. 
LANDRETH, supra note 44, at  62. Some writers believe that this phrase was taken 
from a speech made by Sherman in 1880. Sherman said, “There is many a boy here 
today who looks on war as all glory, but, boys, it is all hell.” From this sentence the 
newspapers coined the phrase, “War is hell.” Other sources attribute the phrase to a 
1879 address made before the Michigan Military Academy where Sherman remarked, 
“I am tired and sick of war. Its glory is all moonshine . . . War is hell.” See WINTLE, 
supra note 16, at  91. 
63 WINTLE, supra note 16, at  24. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.) stated in Pro 
Milone (61 B.C.) “inter a m  legis silent,” which means, in war the law is silent. That 
statement was not true then and is not true today. Rome had very specific rules on the 
regulation of hostilities. See ARTHUR FERRILL, THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (1986). 
One of the earliest examples of rules regulating combat comes from the Torah. For 
example, in the book of Deuteronomy, the Hebrews were given specific instructions on 
the protections that were to be afforded to the inhabitants of a city under siege. In all 
cases, torture was prohibited. Similarly, fruit trees outside of a besieged city were 
870-91 (1991). 
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Sherman never was held accountable for the barbarous out- 
rages that he sponsored. 
IV. Conclusion 
Lee is the only man I know whom I would follow 
blindfolded. 66 
-Thomas J. Jackson 
The antithesis of Sherman, General Lee not only is remem- 
bered as a military genius, but also is praised equally by North 
and South, for his careful adherence to the laws of war-par- 
ticularly in the protection of the property and persons of civil- 
ians. Lee never subjected the northern civilian population to 
the terror and horror that was visited upon his own people. On 
the other hand, to those who have studied the man, Lee knew 
no other way. 
In April 1861, when Lieutenant General Scott received Lee’s 
resignation from the United States Army to offer his services 
to the southern cause, Scott expressed the greatest regret. A 
witness, however, noted that General Scott was consoled 
knowing that he “would have as his opponent a soldier worthy 
of every man’s esteem, and one who would conduct the war 
upon the strictest rules of civilized warfare. There would be no 
outrages committed upon the private persons or property 
which he could prevent.”66 Clearly, even before they were 
codified in the Lieber Code, Scott understood-as did Lincoln, 
Sherman, and Grant-what the customary international rules 
regarding civilized conduct in war required of them.67 
On both of his campaigns into the North, Lee conducted his 
army impeccably, punishing all soldiers convicted for larceny 
of private property. Fully realizing that Union forces wantonly 
had razed civilian homes and farms in the neighboring Shenan- 
doah Valley, Lee nevertheless kept close rein on his soldiers. 
Lee wrote, 
protected from destruction. The fruit could be eaten, but it was unlawful to cut down 
the tree. Deuteronomy 2O:lO-20. 
66 G. F. R. HENDERSON, STONEWALL JACKSON 307 (1989). Considered to be Lee’s finest 
corps commander, General Jackson was wounded mortally at  the battle of Chancellors- 
ville. 
66 JONES, supra note 13, at  128. 
67 Id. 
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No greater disgrace can befall the army and through it our 
whole people, than the perpetration of barbarous outrages 
upon the innocent and defenseless. Such proceedings not 
only disgrace the perpetrators and all connected with 
them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of 
the army, and destructive of the ends of our movement.68 
Although some southerners have criticized Lee for not au- 
thorizing lawful reprisals69 to deter Federal violations in the 
future, General Lee firmly believed that reprisals were not the 
answer. Responding to a letter from the Confederate Secretary 
of War regarding possible Confederate responses to Union 
atrocities, Lee reiterated his position in the summer of 1864: 
As I have said before, if the guilty parties could be taken, 
either the officer who commands, or the soldier who exe- 
cutes such atrocities, I should not hesitate to advise the 
infliction of the extreme punishment they deserve, but I 
cannot think it right or politic, to make the innocent . . . 
suffer for the 
With Americans fighting Americans, Lee knew that the long- 
term effects of engaging in reprisals would not be profitable 
for the nation or the South. He was undoubtedly correct; Lee’s 
strict adherence to the rules regulating warfare, coupled with 
his firm policy prohibiting reprisals, contributed greatly to the 
healing process after the War.71 
One of the driving forces that created the legend of Lee, the 
ultimate gentleman, was his unmatched sense of humanity.72 
“Lee was the soldier-gentleman of tradition, generous, forgiv- 
EDWARD J. STACKPOLE, THEY MET AT GETTYSBURG 31 (1980). 
When one party to the conflict violates an established rule of law, the injured 
party has the right to respond with a use of force that otherwise would be unlawful. 
Reprisals are not designed to punish the offending party, but to persuade it to cease 
and desist the illegal conduct. Under current rules, several criteria-some required by 
domestic policy-must be met before the United States may resort to reprisals. At the 
time of the War Between the States, the injured party first would have to provide a 
warning to the wrongdoing belligerent. If the wrongdoer refused to comply, then the 
injured belligerent could employ a response proportionate to the initial illegal act. See 
FM 27-10, para. 497. 
70 30 S. Hist. Soc’y Papers 94 (1902). 
71See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at  301. Just before the surrender at  Appomattox, 
several officers suggested that the Confederate Army should scatter and “take to the 
hills.” Lee would not permit continued resistance by guerrilla methods. He replied that 
“this kind of warfare would bring only devastation and misery to the people the army 
had been defending.” 
72See BURKE DAVIS, GRAY Fox (1966). 
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ing, silent in the face of failure . . . a hero of mythology.”73 
No matter how great the temptation for legitimate reprisals, a 
concept well recognized in international law, R.E. Lee would 
not stoop to the level of his enemies. This is one of the reasons 
he has been called the “Christian General,”74 as reflected in his 
address to the troops as they marched into Pennsylvania dur- 
ing the Gettysburg campaign of 1863: “It must be remembered 
that we make war only on armed men, and that we cannot take 
vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without 
lowering ourselves in the eyes of . . . Him to whom ven- 
geance b e l ~ n g e t h . ” ~ ~  Instructing his officers to arrest and pun- 
ish all soldiers who committed any offense on the person or 
private property of civilians, he reminded them that “the du- 
ties exacted of us by civilization and Christianity are not less 
obligatory in the country of the enemy than in our 
In contrast, Sherman’s atrocities simply sowed the seeds of 
hatred for generations of southerners-a hatred that is a com- 
mon epitaph for those who commit war crimes. His assumption 
that he could terrorize the South into submission by devastat- 
ing the farms and towns was totally fallacious. “Although the 
havoc wreaked by Sherman’s hordes contributed to the Con- 
federate defeat, this contribution was so indirect and ambigu- 
ous that it did not justify militarily, much less morally, the 
human misery that accompanied and followed it.”77 
Finally, the contention that violations of the law of war are 
necessary in an “ends justifies the means” analysis is funda- 
mentally inaccurate. Aside from the obvious issue of morality, 
violations are most often an unwise waste of military re- 
sources. As the pragmatic Prussian soldier and author, Karl 
von Clausewitz, observed, “If we find that civilized nations do 
not . . . devastate towns and countries, this is because their 
intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of carry- 
ing on War, and has taught them a more effectual means of 
applying force.”78 
73 Id. at  1. 
74See, e.& NAGEL, supra note 18, at  301. Lee’s view on Christian salvation was 
devoid of any form of human merit or morality although by the measure of any soci- 
ety, his own moral standards were impeccable. Grace oriented, he wrote, “I can only 
say that I am a poor sinner, trusting in Christ alone for salvation.” See Addicott, 
supra note 23, at  37. 
76 GRAGG, supra note 7. 
76 Id .  
i7 Robertson, supra note 27, at  20. 
KARL voii CLAvsEwiTz, Ox WAR 4 (J. Graham trans. 1918). 
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One noted historian has described the true legacy of W.T. 
Sherman must rank as the first of the modern totalitarian 
generals. He made war universal, waged it on the enemy’s 
people and not only on armed men, and made terror the 
linchpin of his strategy. To him more than any other man 
must be attributed the hatred that grew out of the Civil 
WarS79 
Sherman as follows: 
In the context of Operation Desert Storm, General Schwarz- 
kopf clearly took only one quality from Sherman-that is, his 
reputation for ferocity. General Schwarzkopf related on nu- 
merous occasions that he hated war and all that it brought.80 
He also pointed out, however, that “once committed to war 
then [one should] be ferocious enough to do whatever is neces- 
sary to get it over with as quickly as possible in victory.”E1 
The difference, of course, was that Schwarzkopf, in lawful 
combat, directed his ferocity toward legitimate military targets 
of the enemy, while Sherman illegally directed his ferocity to- 
ward innocent and helpless civilians. Obviously, only in this 
limited analogy to the concept of “ferocity” did General 
Schwarzkopf pay any respect to William T. Sherman. From a 
military, as well as from a legal and moral perspective, Gen- 
eral Schwarzkopf was not advocating that the United States 
military should find anything positive from the atrocities of 
General Sherman. 
Whether judged in the light of tactics or of moral conduct, 
the actions of the American military in the Gulf WarE2 re- 
flected the impact of Lee-not Sherman. Gauged by these two 
factors, the Persian Gulf was not a place where lessons were 
learned, but a place where lessons were validated. With this 
validation of the magnificent ability and character of the Al- 
lied fighting forces in general, and the American military in 
particular, comes an appropriate tribute to Robert E. Lee. 
Great armies are neither created, nor sustained, by accident. 
To a large degree, great armies are maintained by officers who 
78 WINTLE, supra note 16, at  458. 
80See WASH. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1991, at  6. 
81 Id. 
**See Investigators LXsmiss War-Crime Allegations, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at  
10. Allegations of American soldiers committing war crimes were minimal and all alle- 
gations were investigated promptly. In the Vietnam War, approximately fifty army 
personnel were tried by military courts for war crimes. See PETER KARSTEN, LAW, 
SOLDIERS, AND COMBAT 97 (1978). 
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understand, and then are able to apply, the lessons of military 
history. In this respect, no officer truly can be called a profes- 
sional without a firm commitment to the moral and ethical 
rules regulating combat. Quite naturally, this objective re- 
quires constant training, as well as a comprehensive under- 
standing of one’s moral “roots.” 
With the collapse and dismantling of the Soviet Union, many 
argue that America has become the role model for the world. 
Certainly, this is only part of the truth. To a substantial de- 
gree, the tyranny of communism met its end precisely because 
America always has been humanity’s beacon for all that is 
worthy about mankind. 
Consequently, the military of the United States constantly 
must reaffirm its commitment to the positive values of military 
proficiency and ethical integrity. For instruction, inspiration, 
and inculcation, American officers can find no better role 
model than General Lee. While some may forget, ignore, or 
purposefully deny the role that Lee has had in shaping our 
modern military, to those who are objective, his impact never 
can be obscured,s3 To those who rediscover him through the 
pages of history, he still has much to impart. May the officer 
corps of the United States always reflect his military genius 
and gentle humanity. 
Perhaps the most telling tribute to Lee came from his former 
enemies. When General Lee died in 1870, newspapers through- 
out the North universally praised his military genius and mo- 
r a l i t ~ . ~ ~  The New York Herald said, “In him the military genius 
of America was developed to a greater extent than ever before. 
In him all that was pure and lofty in mind and purpose found 
lodgment. He came nearer the ideal of a soldier and Christian 
general than any man we can think of.’’86 
In a speech given in 1874, Senator Benjamin H. Hill of Geor- 
gia summed up the true greatness of General Robert Edward 
Lee as follows: 
8 3 G ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  supra note 19, at  224. “More than a century after his death, amid the 
vastly different life-style of modern American society, literate Americans who discov- 
ered anew the life of Robert E.  Lee would often be affected with the same awe and 
admiration experienced by Lee’s contemporaries.” 
84 Lee died in Lexington, Virginia, where he served as the President of Washington 
College from 1865 to 1870. 
86 See JOSES, supra note 13, at 482. The Cincinnati Enquirer said, “He was the great 
general of the Rebellion. It was his strategy and superior military knowledge which 
kept the banner of the South afloat for so long . . . , ” The Philadelphia Age called 
him “a great master of defensive warfare . . . probably not [to be] ranked inferior to 
any general known in history.” 
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He was a foe without hate, a friend without treachery, a 
soldier without cruelty, and a victim without murmuring. 
He was a public officer without vices, a private citizen 
without wrong, a neighbor without hypocrisy, and a man 
without guilt. He was Caesar without his ambition, Freder- 
ick without his tyranny, Napoleon without his selfishness 
and Washington without his reward.@ 
s6General Robert E. Lee and His Famous Horse Traveler, in 13 CONFEDERATE VET- 
ERAN 49 (1906). 
